Similarity and Decision Making Under Risk by Ariel Rubinstein
JOURNAL  OF  ECONOMIC  THEORY  46,  145-153  (1988) 
Similarity  and  Decision-making  under  Risk 
(Is  There  a  Utility  Theory  Resolution 
to  the  Allais  Paradox?) 
ARIEL  RUBINSTEIN* 
Department  of  Economics,  The  HehreH’  University.  Jerusalem,  Israel 
Received  January  5,  1987:  revised  September  29,  1987 
It  is  argued  that  the  Allais  paradox  reveals  a  certain  property  of  the  decision 
scheme  we  use  to  determine  the  preference  of  one  lottery  over  another.  The  decision 
scheme  is  based  on  the  use  of  similarity  relations  on  the  probability  and  prize 
spaces. 
It  is  proved  that  for  every  pair  of  similarity  relations  there  is  essentially  only  one 
preference  consistent  with  the  decision  scheme  and  the  similarities.  It  is  claimed  that 
the  result  shows  a  basic  difficulty  in  reconciling  utility  theory  with  experimental 
data.  Journal  of Economic  Literature  Classification  Number:  026.  (~  1988  Academic 
Press.  Inc 
1.  INTR~OUCTI~N 
The  experimental  work  on  choice  under  risk  provides  evidence  that 
human  behavior  is very  often  inconsistent  with  expected  utility  theory.  The 
results  seem  to  be  strongly  supported  by  our  own  “thought  experiments.” 
The  strength  of  the  results  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  these 
phenomena  are  often  deemed  paradoxical. 
Critiques  of  expected  utility  theory  as  a  descriptive  theory  have  led 
countless  scholars  to  alter  the  von  Neumann-Morgenstern  axioms  in  order 
to  establish  alternative  utility  forms  which  would  be  consistent  with  the 
experimental  evidence. 
In  the  traditional  approach  a  list  of  axioms  is  suggested  and  is  proven 
to  imply  a  certain  functional  form  of  the  utility  representations.  Some  of 
these  axioms  are  consistency  requirements  in  the  sense that  they  require 
dependencies  of the  preference  over  different  pairs  of elements.  A  common 
axiom  is  the  independence  axiom:  if  L,  2  L,  then  for  all  t  and  for  all  L, 
*  I  benetitted  from  discussions  with  Peter  Fishburn,  Andreu  Mas-Colell,  Amos  Tversky, 
Cathy  Weinberger,  Asher  Wolinsky,  Menachem  Yaari,  and  especially  Nitza  Kasir  and  Uzi 
Segal,  whom  I  would  like  to  thank.  I  also  thank  Mark  Machina  for  many  comments  which 
helped  me  to  integrate  the  paper  into  the  literature. 
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t.L,0(1-t).Lkt.L20(1-t).L  (the  symbol  @  denotes  the  probability 
mixture  operation).  The  intuitive  argumentation  for  such  an  axiom  is  as 
follows:  if a  subject  is asked  about  the  validity  of the  independence  axiom, 
would  he  not  agree  that  he  does  satisfy  the  axiom?  The  reasonableness  of 
the  axiom  depends  on  the  answer  to  a  hypothetical  question  which 
ordinary  people  (including  experts)  do  not  ask  and  are  not  aware  of. 
The  approach  of this  paper  is  different  in  the  sense that  the  main  axiom 
is  derived  from  what  seems  to  be  a  part  of the  decision-making  procedure. 
Deriving  the  axioms  from  the  natural  process  used  by  people  rather  than 
using  artificial  axioms  is  a  more  promising  strategy  for  constructing  a 
descriptive  theory. 
For  concreteness  let  us consider  a decision  maker  who  has  to  choose  one 
lottery  from  each  of several  pairs  of lotteries.  Assume  all  lotteries  are  of a 
special  simple  kind  (x,  p)  with  the  prize  x  (dollars)  having  probability  p 
and  the  prize  0  (dollars)  probability  1 -  p. 
The  procedure  for  determining  the  preference  studied  here  is exposed  by 
the  following  experiment  which  is  a variant  of the  Allais  ratio  paradox  (see 
Allais  [ 1  ] ). 
Let 
L,=(4000,0.8),  L,=(3000,1) 
L,=(4000,0.2),  L,=(3000,0.25). 
When  asked  to  choose  between  pairs  of  lotteries  (see  Kahneman  and 
Tversky  [4])  the  vast  majority  of  subjects  answered  that  L,  <  L2  and 
L,  >  L,,  violating  the  independence  axiom  (L3  =  0.25 . L,  00.75  .O  and 
L,=O.25  .L,@O.75  .O). 
A  possible  explanation  for  these  preferences  is  the  following:  the 
preference  of L,  over  L,  is due  to  risk  aversion.  When  comparing  L,  and 
L,  the  probabilities  0.2  and  0.25  are  evaluated  to  be  similar  (in  contrast  to 
0.8  and  1 which  are  not  similar),  the  prizes  $4000  and  $3000  are  not  con- 
sidered  by  the  subjects  to  be  similar,  and  the  size of the  prizes  becomes  the 
decisive  factor. 
Thus  to  my  understanding,  the  Allais  paradox  reveals  a certain  property 
of the  decision  scheme  used  by  people  in  the  determination  of preferences 
between  pairs  of  lotteries.  The  decision  scheme  is  based  on  the  use  of 
similarity  relations  on  the  probability  and  prize  spaces. Given  two  lotteries 
(xi,  pI)  and  (x,,  pz)  the  requirement  of the  decision  procedure  is that  it  is 
initiated  by  checking  the  validity  of the  two  statements  “xi  is  similar  to  x2” 
and  “pl  is  similar  to  p2.”  If  only  one  of  the  two  statements  is  true  in  the 
decision  maker’s  perception,  for  instance  xi  is  similar  to  x2,  then  the 
probability  dimension  becomes  the  decisive  factor.  If  in  addition  p1 >  p2 SIMILARITY  AND  DECISION-MAKING  UNDER  RISK  147 
then  (x,,  pl)  is  determined  as preferable  to  (x1,  p*).  If  neither  or  both  of 
the  statements  are  viewed  to  be  correct  then  the  decision  process  is  not 
restricted. 
The  above  procedure  explains  some  other  famous  paradoxical  examples 
like  the  classical  Allais  paradox.  In  this  example  a decision  maker  is asked 
to  choose  between  a  sure  chance  of  $1,000,000  and  a  lo:89  : 1  chance 
of  $5,000,000:  $l,OOO,OOO: $0  and  then  between  a  lo:90  chance  of 
$5,000,000  : $0  and  a  11: 89  chance  of  $1,000,000  : $0.  The  first  common 
preference  of the  sure  lottery  is  explained  by  risk  aversion  while  the  latter 
preference  of the  lo:90  chance  lottery  is explained  by  the  use of the  above 
procedure. 
In  this  paper  we will  derive  the  consequences  of the  decision  scheme  on 
the  set  of preferences  that  are  consistent  with  it.  The  main  finding  is  that 
similarities  on  both  the  prize  and  the  probability  dimensions  result  in  a 
“unique”  preference  which  is consistent  with  the  similarities  and  the  above 
procedure.  Thus  there  is  little  room  for  other  considerations  to  affect  the 
determination  of a preference.  An  examination  of the  determination  of the 
preference  L,  over  L,  in  the  above  example  reveals  that  when  neither  x,  is 
similar  to  x2,  nor  p1  similar  to  pz,  we use  other  criteria  to  determine  the 
preference.  I  find  it  hard  to  believe  that  such  other  considerations  will  coin- 
cide  with  the  “unique”  preference  relation  consistent  with  the  similarities. 
Therefore  the  above  result  shows  a  basic  difficulty  in  reconciling  utility 
theory  with  decision-making  procedures  as described  above. 
The  paper  is in  line  with  works  of Amos  Tversky  in  two  aspects.  First,  it 
emphasizes  the  role  of similarities  in  human  reasoning  (see Tversky  [9]). 
Second,  it  points  out  that  actual  decision  procedures  may  lead  to  non- 
transitivity  (see Tversky  [8]).  The  work  is  also  related  to  previous  works 
by  Lute  ([S,  61)  and  Ng  [7]. 
2.  THE  BASIC  CONCEPTS 
2.1.  Preferences  on  the  Set  of  Lotteries 
Denote  by  (x,  p)  a lottery  which  gives  prize  x  with  probability  p  and  the 
prize  0  with  probability  1 -  p,  where  0 <x<  1.  The  set  Xx  P=  [0,  l]  x 
[IO, l]  is  the  set  of lotteries.  Denote  by  2  a  binary  relation  on  the  set  of 
lotteries.  L,  >  L,  means  that  lottery  L,  is strictly  preferred  to  lottery  L,.  It 
is  assumed  that  2  satisfies  the  following  assumptions: 
(R- 1)  The  relation  is  transitive  and  reflexive. 
(R-2)  The  relation  is  monotonic:  x1 >  x2  and  p1 >  pz  imply  that 
613  PI)‘(-GT  Pd. 
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So  far  the  set Xx  P  has  no  meaning  beyond  being  a  square.  Under  the 
above  interpretation  of (x,  p)  as a lottery  there  is no  difference  between  any 
of the  pairs  (x,  0)  and  (0, p).  Therefore  we assume: 
(R-4)  For  all  x  and  p,  (x,  0)  and  (0,  p)  are  indifferent  to  (0,O). 
Utility  theory  states  that  there  is  a  function  U:  Xx  P -+ R  satisfying 
L,  >  L,  iff  U( L,)  >  U( L2).  The  expected  utility  theory  hypothesis  is  that 
there  exists  a function  u: X  +  R  such  that  U(x,  p)  =  pu(x)  +  (1 -  p)  u(O). 
2.2.  Similarity 
A  binary  relation  -  on  the  set A  =  [0,  11  is a  similarity  relation  if: 
(S-l)  For  all  aEA,  a-a. 
(S-2)  For  all  a,  b E A,  if a -  b  then  b -a. 
(S-3)  Continuity:  the  graph  of  -  is  closed. 
(S-4)  Betweenness:  if a<b<c<dand  a-d  then  b-c. 
(S-5)  Non-degeneracy: 
(1)  For  all  O<a<  1 there  are  b  and  c,  c<a<b,  such  that  b-a 
and  c -  a.  For  a =  1 there  is  c as above.  Thus  the  only  element  which  may 
not  be  similar  to  any  other  element  in  A  is  zero. 
(2)  0  ‘7L 1. 
Notation.  a*=max{b:b-a}  and  a,=min{b:b-a}.  Notice  that 
unless  a*  =  1, (a*),  =  a,  and  unless  a,  =  0,  (a,)*  =  a. 
(S-6)  Responsiveness:  a*  and  a,  are  strictly  increasing  functions  at 
any  point  where  they  get  a  value  in  the  open  interval  (0,  1). 
EXAMPLES.  The  s-difference  similarity  is  defined  by  x -  y  if  Ix  -  yl  6  E. 
The  l-ratio  similarity  is  defined  by  x-y  if  l/1  <  x/y  d  2. 
The  concept  of  similarity  as  defined  here  is  closely  related  to  Lute’s 
concept  of semi-order  (see Lute  [S]  ). If  -  is  a similarity  relation  then  the 
binary  relation  P  defined  by  aPb  if a >  b  and  a ?L b  is  a semi-order. 
Remark,  Avishai  Margalit  pointed  out  to  me  that  in  the  natural 
language  a similarity  relation  does  not  satisfy  the  symmetry  requirements. 
Therefore,  in  the  context  of this  paper  it  could  be  better  to  use the  phrase 
“a  is  approximately  the  same  as b”  rather  than  “a  is  similar  to  b.” 
2.3.  Presentation  of  Similarity  Relations 
Let  H(a)  be  a  strictly  increasing  and  positive  function  on  the  unit  inter- 
val  and  let  II  be  a number  strictly  greater  than  1. The  relation  -  defined  by 
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is  a  similarity  relation.  It  is  said  that  the  pair  (H,  n)  represents  the 
similarity  relation  -. 
The  next  proposition  states  that  a  similarity  relation  has  a  represen- 
tation.  The  proposition  is  close  to  previous  representation  theorems  of 
semi-orders.  For  an  excellent  survey  of those  theorems  see Fishburn  [3]. 
PROPOSITION  1.  For  all  similarity  -  (satisfying  (S-l)  to  (S-6))  and for 
all I  >  1 there  is  a function  H  such  that  a -  h  iff 
Proof  Define  inductively  a  sequence  (x”)  such  that  x0=  1  and 
x n+‘=(x”)*.  By  (S-3),  xn+’  is  well  defined.  By  (S-5),  xn +  0.  Define 
N(  1) =  1.  Define  H  on  the  interval  [.x1, x0]  as  any  strictly  increasing 
function  satisfying  H(x’)  =  l/1  and  H(x’)  =  1.  For  XE  [x”+  ‘,  x”]  define 
H(x)  =  H(x*)/k  By  (S-6)  the  function  H  is  strictly  increasing.  If  0  ?L x  for 
all  x #  0 define  H(0)  =  0.  (Otherwise  there  is an  n such  that  X” =  0.) 
We  still  have  to  verify  that  (H,  A)  represents  -.  First  assume  l/E. d 
H(a)/H(b)  d  2 and  ad  6. Then  by  the  construction  of H,  b 6 a*.  By  (S-4), 
a-b.  Second  assume  a N  6.  By  (S-4),  a,  6  b 6 a*.  By  the  construction  of 
H,  H(a)=  H(a*)/l  unless  a* =  1,  where  H(a)>  H(a*)/1.  Unless  a,  =O, 
a =  (a,)*  and  H(a)  =  H(a,)A.  If  a,  =O,  H(a)  <  H(a,)l.  Thus,  H(a)2  2 
H(a*)  >  H(b)  and  H(b)/H(a)  d H(a*)/H(a)  d  1. Similarly,  H(b)  >  H(a,)  2 
H(a)/A.  Therefore,  l/A  6 H(b)/H(a)  < II. 
3.  A  PROCEDURE  FOR  PREFERENCE  DETERMINATION 
In  this  section  we will  analyze  a procedure  for  preference  determination. 
We  will  refer  to  such  a  procedure  as  *  procedure.  Let  L,  =  (x,,  pi)  and 
L,  =  (x,,  p2)  be  two  lotteries.  Coming  to  determine  the  preferred  lottery, 
an  individual  is  assumed  to  go  through  the  following  steps: 
step  1:  If both  x,  >  x2 and  p,  >  p2 then  L,  > L,. 
If  this  step  is not  decisive  move  to  step  2. 
step  2:  If  p,  -  p2r  -Xl  4,  x2,  and  x,  >  x2 then  L,  > L,. 
If  P* +p  P2, x1  “.YXZ,  and  p1 >  pz  then  L,  > L,. 
If  this  step  is  not  decisive  then  move  to  step  3  which  is  not 
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DEFINITION.  A  preference  2  is said  to  satisfy  codition  *  relative  to  the 
similarities  -  .~ and  -p  if for  all  xi,  pi >  0: 
(1)  Whenever  p1  -,,p2,  x,  +,x2,  and  x,>x2  then  (xl,p,)> 
(-x2*  Pd. 
(2)  Whenever  p,  ?L,, p2.  x,  -  r~2,  and  p,  >  p2  then  (x,,  pl)> 
C-%3  Pd. 
Let  C be  the  set of all  (-.~,  -  P,  2  ) such that  2  satisfies  both  (R-l  )-(R-4) 
and  *  relative  to  similarities  -  .~ and  -P  satisfying  (S-l  )-(S-6). 
EXAMPLE.  Let  2  be  a preference  represented  by  the  utility  function  ~4. 
Let  -I  and  -,,  be  the  A and  the  I”  ratio  similarities.  Then  2  satisfies  * 
relative  to  -I  and  -P.  (If  p1  -,,p2,  xi  7Lrx2,  and  x,>x,  then  x;p,> 
(x,AYp,  =  x;nmp,  2  qp2.J 
It  should  be  mentioned  that  although  they  are  different  there  are  com- 
mon  factors  between  the  above  procedure  and  procedures  suggested  in 
Encarnacion  [2]  and  in  Lute  [6]. 
LEMMA  1.  If  ( mJ,  wP,  2  ) E C  then  there  is  no  strictly  positive  x  or  p 
such  that  0  -r~  or  0  wpp. 
Proof:  Assume  x>O  and  x  -,O.  By  (S-5)  on  wP,  l,#O.  By  *  for  all 
F>O,  (x,  l*-E)<(O,  l),  and  by  (R-3),  (x,  l,)s(O,  1).  By  (R-4), 
(0,  1) -  (0,O).  By  (R-l),  (x,  l*)  5  (0, 0),  contradicting  the  monotonicity 
(R-2). 
Remark.  By  Lemma  1 there  is  no  preference  relation  which  satisfies  * 
relative  to  difference  similarities.  Obviously  this  is  not  correct  unless  (R-4) 
is  assumed. 
The  rest  of the  paper  is devoted  to  a study  of the  set  C. It  will  be  argued 
that  *  puts  a  very  tight  restriction  on  the  set of preferences  consistent  with 
a  pair  of  similarities.  The  main  conclusion  of  the  paper  is  that  if an  indi- 
vidual  uses a  *  procedure  and  if his  choice  is  transitive  then  independently 
of  what  he  is  doing  in  step  3,  the  preference  relation  he  produces  is 
“almost”  unique  and  represented  by  a  utility  function  g(p)  u(x).  Thus  the 
information  about  the  individual’s  similarity  relations  and  the  information 
that  he  uses  a  *  procedure  “almost”  characterize  a  decision  maker  and 
leave  very  little  room  for  any  other  considerations. 
PROPOSITION  2.  Let  -  x and  wp  be similarities  satisfying  that  there  is  no 
x >  0 or  p >  0 such  that  0  wx  x  or  0 -*  p.  Then  there  are functions  u: X +  R 
and  g: P +  R  such  that: SIMILARITY  AND  DECISION-MAKING  UNDER  RISK  151 
(a)  The function  g(p)  (  )  p  u  x  re  resents  a preference  on Xx  P  satisfying 
(R-l  t(R-4),  and  satisfies  *  relative  to  -  .~ and  -p. 
(b)  O-C-.rT  -  p,  Z)EC  then  for  all  (x,,  p,)  and  (x,,  p2)  satisfying 
g(p,)  u(xI)  >  g(p2)  u(xz)  there  are  x:  -xi  and  pi  -,,  pi such  that  (xi,  pi)  > 
(4,  Pi). 
Proof  of  (a).  By  Proposition  1  and  Lemma  1  there  are  continuous 
and  strictly  increasing  functions  u  and  g  satisfying  u(0)  =  g(0)  =  0  and  a 
number  J. >  1 which  represents  -  5 and  wp  accordingly.  Let  Z  be  a pref- 
erence  represented  by  g(p)  u(x).  It  will  be  proved  that  ( -  i,  wp,  k  ) E C. 
Assume  x,  -  .~  x2,  P,  +pzy  and  pl>p2.  Then  l/A  <  u(x,)/u(x?)  and 
2 <  g(plMp2).  Therefore  dp,)  4x1)>  g(pJ  4x2). 
LEMMA  2.  Let  ( -  y,  -  p,  2  ) E C.  For  all  (x,  p)  such  that  x.+ >  0  and 
p*>o,  (x*7  P)-(-T  P,). 
Proof:  By  *,  C-x, P*-E)<(x*,  P ) for  all  E  small  enough.  By  the  con- 
tinuity  of  2,  (x,  p*)  5  (x,,  p).  By  a  similar  argument  (x,,  p)  5  (x,  p,). 
See the  following  diagram. 





x*  x 
Proof  of  (b).  Assume  (-.,  -P,  ~)EC.  Assume  g(p, 1  4x1)  > 
g(p2)  u(xz).  Notice  that  x1 #O  and  p1 #O.  At  least  one  of the  inequalities 
p,  >  p2  and  x1 >  x2  is  true.  If  both  are  true,  then  by  the  monotonicity  of 
2,  (xl,  p,)>  (x2,  pz).  Assume  p,  >  p2  and  x2>x1.  Define  a  sequence 
(x’;,  pf)  as follows.  First,  xy =  x1 and  py  =  p,.  Then  xf =  (x’;-  l)*  and  p’; = 
(p:~‘),.  By  Lemma  2,  (x’;,  p’;)  -  (x:-I,  pf-I).  The  functions  u and  g must 
satisfy  u(x~)  =  u(xr)  Ak and  g(pt)  =  g(p,)  Ipk.  Let  K  be  the  first  such  that 
u($)  2  u(x2*),  u(xf)  d  24(x2) and  therefore 
dP3  lk  =  &API)’ 
g(P*)  4x2)  ,dPzbw 
4x1)  4x1) 
=dP2)~K. 
Thus  g(pf)  >  g(p2).  Obviously,  p;”  7L p2* and  xf  -  .~  x2*.  Since  2  satisfies 
*  relative  to  -y  and  -P  then  (xf,  pfl)>(x,,,  p2*).  Thus  (x,,  p,)- 
N?  P;“)’  (x2*,  P?*). 152  ARIEL  RUBINSTEIN 
Remark.  Kevin  Roberts  drew  my  attention  to  the  close  relation 
between  the  above  proof  and  the  work  of Y.  K.  Ng,  see [7]. 
4.  THE  SIMILARITIES  WHICH  ARE  CONSISTENT  WITH  A  PREFERENCE 
In  the  previous  section  we asked  the  question  what  are  the  preferences 
which  are  consistent  with  *  relative  to  a  given  pair  of similarities?  In  this 
section  we ask  the  opposite  question:  Given  a  preference  2  what  are  the 
wI.  and  wP  satisfying  ( -  .~, -  p,  2  ) E C?  The  answer  to  this  question 
provides  a  test  for  the  plausibility  of  assumptions  about  preference 
relations. 
PROPOSITION  3.  Assume  k  is  represented  by  the  utility  function 
g(p)  u(x),  where g  and  u  are positive,  continuous, and  strictly  increasing 
functions.  Zf (-  'i, N p,  2 ) E C then there is an 1>  1 such that 
Xl  N.Y-x2  iff  l/ll6u(x,)/u(x,)6J. 
and 
PI  “pP2  iff  1/~~g(PzVdP,)~~. 
Proof  Pick  p1 >  pz #  0  satisfying  p,  wP p2.  For  all  xi  >  x2,  satisfying 
gh)  4x2)  >  g(p2)  4-d  and  thus  dplMp2)>  ~(xlMx2~. 
?hkifzk  the  set  (u(x,)/u(x~)  1  xi  wx x2}  is  bounded  and  has  a supremum 
A,.  Similarly,  let  1,=  sup{g(p,)/g(p2)l  p,  wP  p2}.  Next  it  is  shown  that 
A, =  1,.  If  1,  >  A,  we could  have  chosen  x,  -  I  x2  and  p,  7L  p p2 such  that 
~.~>u(x~)/u(x~)>~(P~)/~(P~)>~~.  BY  *,  (x2,  P~)>Lc  PJ  despite  the 
fact  that  gh)  4-d  >  dp2)  4x2). 
Denote  1=1,=1,,  and  let  x2>xl,  satisfying  1>  u(x2)/u(x1)  and 
xl  4,  x2.  There  are  p1  and  p2  satisfying  p1 -P  p2  and  g(p2)/g(pl)> 
4x2Mxl)  and  then  by  *,  (P,,  x2)  >  (~2,  xl)  although  dp2)  4x1)> 
g(p,)  u(x2).  Thus  for  all  x2 >xi  such  that  A>  u(x,)/u(x,),  xl  -x2.  By 
continuinity  of  -5  it  is  also  true  that  for  all  x1  and  x2  satisfying 
u(x*)/u(x,)  =  A, x,  -  r x2. 
Conclusion.  If  2  is  represented  by  pu(x)  (or  g(p)x)  and 
(-.x9  -  p,  2  ) E C  then  -p  (or  -  ,)  is  a ratio  similarity. 
Thus  to  be  consistent  with  expected  utility  theory  a  similarity  on  the 
probability  dimension  must  be  of  the  ratio  similarity  type.  A  possible 
explanation  for  the  Allais  paradox  is that  the  underlying  similarity  relation 
for  the  probability  space  is not  of the  ratio  type.  Although  0.8/l  =  0.2/0.25, 
the  probabilities  0.2  and  0.25  are  perceived  to  be  similar  while  the 
probabilities  0.8  and  1  are  not. 
Only  a  ratio  similarity  on  the  price  dimension  is  consistent  with  Yaari’s 
dual  theory  (see Yaari  [lo]). SIMILARITY  AND  DECISION-MAKING  UNDER  RISK  1.53 
5.  FINAL  REMARKS 
Admittedly  this  paper  was  initiated  as  a  reaction  to  the  flow  of  papers 
which  attempt  to  save  utility  theory  paradigm  by  relaxing  or  modifying 
some  of the  VNM  axioms.  My  feeling  is  that  such  attempts  overlook  the 
real  objective  of constructing  a  descriptive  theory  for  decisions  under  risk. 
In  order  to  construct  such  a  theory  one  cannot  avoid  tackling  the  black 
box  of  the  decision  procedures  themselves.  This  led  me  to  formalize  a 
certain  property  of decision-making  procedures  and  to  ascertain  some  of its 
consequences. 
The  results  may  have  two  interpretations.  On  the  positive  side  it  con- 
nects  the  notion  of  similarity  with  the  notion  of  preference  with  a  tight 
correspondence.  On  the  negative  side  it  casts  doubt  as to  whether  human 
choices  from  among  a  set  of  lotteries  are  indeed  transitive.  Property  *  is 
only  a first  stage  in  the  decision  procedure.  The  property  does  not  specify 
the  way  in  which  the  preference  over  lotteries  is  determined  in  case 
X,  7L  x .x2 and  p1  7L  p pz.  It  is hard  to  believe  that  the  rest  of the  procedure 
which  people  use  is  consistent  with  calculating  the  functions  g  and  u  of 
Proposition  2. 
My  own  conclusion  from  this  study  is  to  quote  again  Herbert  Simon: 
“There  is  an  urgent  need  to  expand  the  established  body  of  economics 
analysis...  to  encompass  the  procedural  aspects  of decision-making.” 
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